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RECENT DECISIONS

the contingency. 4 The courts will not apply this doctrine to cases
in which the contingency should have been foreseen.5
In applying this doctrine the court follows an unbroken line of
cases holding that performance of a contract is excused when prevented by a governmental order. In one case a defendant was excused from paying rent on an electrical advertising display when its
illumination was prohibited by fuel conservation orders. 6 In another
the breach of a contract to return a person to Norway was excused
when prevented by war restrictions. 7 A contract of carriage by sea
was dissolved when governmental action caused the loss of the ship
prior to the time of voyage. 8 Performance of contracts for the delivery of cotton goods at a set price was excused when the Office of
Price Administration fixed a maximum price lower than that specified in the contract.9 The failure to deliver gold to England was
held not to constitute a breach of contract since the imminence of
war between England and Germany created a grave danger that the
ship would be captured if the terms of the contract were performed.10
In discounting the contention that the action of the Maritime
Commission should have been foreseen, the court points out that the
contingency primarily responsible for the breach in this case was the
Pearl Harbor disaster which was hardly foreseeable. The case therefore falls directly in line with those excusing performance made impossible by a governmental order.
W. J. N.

EQUITY-INJUNCTION-TRADE NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION-ACTION TO ENJOIN THE USE OF NAME.-Plaintiff's Hotel

New Yorker, established in 1930 in New York City, contains some
2500 rooms and maintains a large budget for advertising and publicity on a national scale. Of its national and international clientele,
several thousand yearly are drawn from Missouri and several hundred from Kansas City. Almost continuously since 1920 the defendants had operated various restaurants including one called the "New
4Lion Brewery of New York City v. Patrick Loughran, 131 Misc. 331,
226 N.
Y. Supp. 656 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
5
Madeirense Do Brazil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F. 2d
399 (2d Cir. 1945); Browne v. Fletcher Aviation Corp., 67 Cal. App. 2d
855, 155 P. 2d 896 (1945).
620th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App. 2d 938, 149 P. 2d 88
(1944).
7 Borup v. Western Operating Corp., 130 F. 2d 381 (2d Cir. 1942).
8Texas Co. v.Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U. S.619, 631 (1921).
9
Kramer v. Uchitelle, 288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. 2d 493 (1942).
10 The Kronprinzessin Cecille, 244 U. S. 12 (1917).
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Yorker Bar and Restaurant" in Kansas City where they have acquired there a local reputation as restaurateurs. In 1948 they sold
this "New Yorker Bar" and rented a small hotel nearby which they
called the "Hotel New Yorker." After being requested by plaintiffs
to cease using this name the defendants continued to display an exterior sign designating the establishment as "Pusateri's New Yorker
Hotel." Held, judgment for defendants. The court found as a fact
that the words "Hotel New Yorker" had acquired a secondary meaning connoting plaintiff's hotel.' Nevertheless the court found there
would be no reasonable possibility of confusion or deception, at least
in Kansas City, and refused to enjoin defendants' use of the name
"Pusateri's New Yorker Hotel." Hotel New Yorker Corp. v.
Pusateri et al., 87 F. Supp. 294 (W. D. Mo. 1950).
A geographical name is not protected as a common law trade
name 2 unless it is first found as a fact 3 that the name has acquired
a "secondary" meaning which in trade or common usage is a symbol
for something other than its geographical denotation. 4 A trade name
whose secondary meaning so identifies its owner is a valuable property right.5 One who would adopt it in a place from which even a
small part of the owner's trade is drawn 6 must distinguish from its
secondary meaning.7 The addition of a personal name is perhaps a
greater wrong because the added name is thereby imbued with the
owner's good will.8 In the ultimate analysis, such is the law which
protects the consumer, be he reasonable and prudent or ignorant and
credulous. 9
1Western Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 93 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir. 1937);
R. W. Eldridge Co., Inc. v. Southern Handkerchief Mfg. Co., 93 F. Supp.
179 (W.
D. S. C. 1938).
2
Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665
(1901) ; The President, etc., of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark,
13 Wall. 311 (U. S. 1871).
3 RESTATEmENT, TORTS

4

§ 716, comment b (1937).

Western Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 93 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir. 1937);
Trappey v. McIlhenny Co., 281 Fed. 23 (5th Cir. 1922) (connoting a unique
appropriator); Baglin v. Cusanier Co., 221 U. S. 580 (1910); La Republique
Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs, 107 Fed. 459 (2d Cir. 1901) (connoting
a unique product); Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture
Co., 127 F. 2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942) (connoting a unique process).
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1915) ; Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
6 Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F. 2d 920 (8th Cir.
1926); accord, Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa.
1941).
L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 236 U. S. 88 (1914); S. C.
Johnson and Sons, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F. 2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940).
8 Shaver v. Heller and Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821 (8th Cir. 1901); accord,
Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514 (1888).
9 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); CocaCola Co. v. Chere-Cola Co., 273 Fed. 755 (App. D. C. 1921); Florence Mfg.
Co. v. J. C. Dowd and Co., 178 Fed. 273 (2d Cir. 1910)
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Under another and possibly out-moded viewpoint, 10 relief will
depend on facts extrinsic to the meaning acquired by the name. Here
the test is: would a reasonably prudent purchaser probably be confused as to the source of the goods or services. 1 Here such elements as good faith, geographical location, relative size, the products
or services involved and so on become important.
The court in the instant case applied the "prudent purchaser"
test and based its decision on the ground that defendants' own name,
coupled with its established reputation in the local restaurant trade,
was sufficient to distinguish the two hotels and to obviate any reasonable possibility of local confusion. This conclusion was buttressed
by taking judicial notice of the "undoubted" existence of other hotels
named "New Yorker" and of the actual existence of other hotels
which are operated in different cities although under substantially
identical names.1 2
It is submitted that the addition of defendants' name, even with
their local reputation as restaurateurs, is an insufficient distinction.
They could as easily secure the benefits of that reputation to their
hotel business without using plaintiff's name. With "all infinity" to
choose from,' 3 why permit the use of "New Yorker" for a hotel in
Kansas City when it is so flagrantly fictitious? 14
Perhaps more cogent is the precedent established permitting any
number of "Hotels New Yorker" distinguished only by the owner's
name. The protection of plaintiff's name would then be so narrowly.
circumscribed both as to area and as to trade that plaintiff's property
in its name would be virtually destroyed and its reputation necessarily injured.
. J. M.

NATURALIZATION -

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER AS A CONDITION

PRcEDENT.--Petitioner, a tavern keeper, was a native Syrian, fiftyeight years old, a resident of the United States and Louisiana for
forty-six years, married and the father of eight American-born chil10 See the opinion of Learned Hand, J., in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler
Safe Co., 7 F. 2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925).
"American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1926); Howe
Scale Company v. Wyckoff, Seamans and Benedict, 196 U. S. 118 (1905).
Accord, Eastern Construction Co. v. Eastern Engineering Corp., 246 N. Y.
459, 2159 N. E. 397 (1927).
2 But cf. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., Inc., et al. v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Corp.,
66 F. Supp. 720 (S. D. Fla. 1946) (a Florida hotel enjoined on behalf of a
Newv York hotel).
13 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd and Co., supra note 9 at 75.
'4See La Republique Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs, 107 Fed. 459
(2d Cir. 1901).

